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UNITED STATES V. FRIDAY AND THE FUTURE OF NATIVE
AMERICAN RELIGIOUS CHALLENGES TO THE BALD AND
GOLDEN EAGLE PROTECTION ACT
INTRODUCTION
For the Northern Arapaho Indian tribe on the Wind River Reserva-
tion in Wyoming, the Sun Dance is the most sacred of religious ceremo-
nies.' Held annually "after the first thunder of the spring,,2 and lasting
anywhere from four to eight days, the Sun Dance portrays the continuity
between death and rebirth and the interdependence of all natural things.3
The eagle, which is considered a "sacred messenger to the spirit world," 4
is an essential component of the Dance; without the tail of an eagle,
along with several other religiously significant objects, the Sun Dance
cannot occur.5
After he was prosecuted for killing a bald eagle for the Sun Dance,
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals considered Northern Arapaho tribal
member Winslow Friday's religious challenge against the Bald and Gol-
den Eagle Protection Act (BGEPA).6 The court held that the BGEPA's
Native American religious exception is facially valid and the least re-
strictive means of furthering the government's compelling interest in
protecting eagles. As a result, in Friday's case, the court held that the
BGEPA did not violate the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act of
1993 (RFRA). 8 Although the court noted that the permitting system
could be more accommodating, because Friday never applied for a per-
mit to take an eagle, the court did not extensively consider the restrictive
nature of the system.
9
This Comment examines the Tenth Circuit's United States v. Friday
opinion along with its underlying implications. Part I provides a brief
historical analysis of the BGEPA and introduces relevant statutory provi-
sions, including the exception that allows Native Americans to apply for
eagle take permits. Part II analyzes the development of RFRA to provide
1. Appellee's Opening Brief at 1, United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938 (10th Cir. Jun 27,
2007) (No. 06-8093), 2007 WL 2437229.
2. United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938, 942 (10th Cir. 2008). According to the opinion in
Friday, details about the Sun Dance are "guarded, and access by outsiders is limited... [without]
the consent of the Northern Tribal elders." Id.
3. See Sun Dance, http://www.crystalinks.com/sundance.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2009).
4. Antonio M. De Meo, Access to Eagles and Eagle Parts: Environmental Protection v.
Native American Free Exercise of Religion, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 771,774 (1995).
5. Appellee's Opening Brief at 2, Friday, 525 F.3d 938 (No. 06-8093), 2007 WL 2437229.
6. Friday, 525 F.3d at 942.
7. See id. at 942, 960.
8. See id.
9. See id. at 960.
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a better understanding of how RFRA affects Native American religious
challenges to the BGEPA. Part 1II surveys relevant precedent in hopes
of better understanding the opinion in Friday, and the avenues left open
for future litigation. Part IV reviews the Friday opinion and discusses its
relevant procedural history. Part V analyzes the Friday opinion in con-
text with relevant precedent, discusses the implications of the Friday
decision, and discusses the avenues left open for Native American reli-
gious challenges to the BGEPA after Friday.
I. THE BALD AND GOLDEN EAGLE PROTECTION ACT' 0
A. History
The bald eagle began receiving congressional attention in the 1930s
as it became apparent that its populations were beginning to decline."
On June 8, 1940, Congress passed the Bald Eagle Protection Act; the
enacting clause described the bald eagle "as the national symbol" and
"no longer a mere bird of biological interest but a symbol of American
ideals and freedom."1 2 In 1962, Congress extended protection to golden
eagles in order to protect their dwindling populations and because they
were often mistaken for young bald eagles.13
The BGEPA subjects violators to both criminal and civil penalties. 14
Under the BGEPA, if an individual "shall . . . take, possess, sell, pur-
chase, barter, offer to sell, purchase or barter, transport, export or import"
any bald or golden eagle, "alive or dead, or any part, nest, or egg thereof
... [the individual] shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned
not more than one year or both." 15 A violator is subject to civil penalties
of up to $5,000 for every violation.' 6 Because eagles are so important in
Native American religion, 17 Congress created an exception allowing the
issuance of permits for Native Americans wishing to take an eagle for
religious purposes.'
8
10. The Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act, 16 U.S.C.A. § 668 (West 2008).
11. See Matthew Perkins, The Federal Indian Trust Doctrine and the Bald and Golden Eagle
Protection Act: Could Application of the Doctrine Alter the Outcome in U.S. v. Hugs?, 30 ENVTL. L.
701, 705 (2000).
12. An Act for the Protection of the Bald Eagle, ch. 278, 54 Stat. 250 (1940) (codified at 16
U.S.C.A. § 668 (West 2008)).
13. Tina S. Boradiansky, Conflicting Values: The Religious Killing of Federally Protected
Wildlife, 30 NAT. RESOURCES J. 709, 720 (1990).
14. 16 U.S.C.A. § 668(a)-(b).
15. Id. § 668(a).
16. Id. § 668(b).
17. De Meo, supra note 4, at 774 (noting that "Native Americans hold eagle feathers sacred
and equate them to the cross or the Bible in western religions.").
18. See 16 U.S.C.A. § 668(a); see also 50 C.F.R. § 22.22 (2008).
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B. The BGEPA Native American Religious Exception
19
The BGEPA accommodates Native Americans who need eagles in
two ways. First, Native Americans can obtain eagles and eagle parts
through the National Eagle and Wildlife Property Repository in Com-
merce City, Colorado.20 Receiving an eagle from the repository takes up
to two years and the eagles received are often in dire shape.21 In addi-
tion, obtaining eagles through the repository does not fulfill the demands
of many Native American tribes whose religious ceremonies require a
64 , 22pure" eagle.
Alternatively, the Director of the Interior or the Director of the
United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) may issue a permit autho-
rizing a Native American to "take" 23 a bald or golden eagle for religious
24purposes. Only members of federally recognized tribes may apply for a
permit.25 The application requires an individual to specify the species to
be taken, the location of the take, the name of the tribe, and the religious
ceremony for which the eagle is to be used.26 In determining whether or
not to grant a permit, the FWS must consider the direct and indirect ef-
fect that issuing the permit will have on eagle populations, and whether
the applicant is "authorized to participate in bona fide tribal religious
ceremonies. 27
The FWS has never issued an eagle take permit for a Native Ameri-
can in the Rocky Mountain and Plains region.28 Nationwide, the FWS
has issued a take permit to the Hopi tribe every year since 1986 to take
golden eagles. 29  The FWS also periodically grants golden eagle take
permits to the Navajo tribe and the Taos Pueblo tribe.30 Overall, in the
Southwest, the FWS has issued golden eagle take permits to tribes, never
to an individual, seventy-five percent of the time.31 The significance of
19. See 50 C.F.R. § 22.22 (2008).
20. The National Eagle Repository is a government warehouse where dead eagles are col-
lected. Some of the eagles at the repository are confiscated contraband, some are the victims of
electrocution on power lines, some are roadkill. United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938, 944 (10th
Cir. 2008).
21. De Meo, supra note 4, at 790-91.
22. Friday, 525 F.3d at 943. A pure eagle is one that has been taken with care. It cannot have
died through poison, disease, or electrocution, and it cannot be roadkill. Id.
23. The term "take" includes to "pursue, shoot, shoot at, poison, wound, kill, capture, trap,
collect, molest or disturb." 50 C.F.R. § 22.3 (2007).
24. 16 U.S.C.A. § 668(a). The permitting exception within the BGEPA abrogates previous
treaties which allowed Native Americans to take bald and golden eagles. See United States v. Dion,
476 U.S. 734, 745 (1986).
25. See 50 C.F.R. § 22.22 (2008).
26. Id. § 22.22(a).
27. Id. § 22.22(c).
28. Appellee's Opening Brief at 10, United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938 (10th Cir. June 27,
2007) (No. 06-8093), 2007 WL 2437229.
29. Id.
30. Brief of Appellant at 5, United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938 (No. 06-8093), 2007 WL
1300419.
31. Appellee's Opening Brief at 32, United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938 (No. 06-8093).
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this seemingly high rate is minimized by the fact that there have been
only four applications to take a golden eagle, three of which were
granted.32 Furthermore, the FWS has never issued a permit to take a bald
eagle and has never issued an individual Native American a permit to
take either type of eagle.33
II. THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND RESTORATION ACT OF 199334
The First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no law res-
pecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise the-
reof. 3 5 In Sherbert v. Verner, the Court held that any burden on an indi-
vidual's religion was subject to strict scrutiny and must be justified by a
"compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject within the State's
constitutional power to regulate. 36 In the late 1980s, however, the Court
began shifting away from strict scrutiny by providing more deference to
the state interest in question.37 In Employment Division v. Smith,3 8 the
Court seemingly changed its constitutional analysis of Free Exercise
claims. In Smith, the Court stated that "the right of free exercise does not
relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral
law of general applicability." 39 A neutral law of general applicability,
therefore, was not subject to strict scrutiny, and did not require a compel-
ling state interest in order to justify burdening an individual's religion.
In response to the decision in Smith, and to restore strict scrutiny, Con-
gress enacted the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act of 1993
(RFRA).4
Less than four years after its enactment, the Supreme Court invali-
dated RFRA in City of Boerne v. Flores.41 In Flores, the Court held that
Congress lacked the authority to enact RFRA through the Fourteenth
Amendment's enforcement clause; RFRA, therefore, became inapplica-
ble to actions against the states.42 With regard to federal law, however,
the Tenth Circuit recently held that "the separation of powers concerns
expressed in Flores do not render RFRA unconstitutional as applied to
32. Id. at 10.
33. Brief of Amicus Curiae of the Northern Arapaho Tribe in Support of Defendant-Appellee
at 3-4, United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938 (No. 06-8093) (noting that permits have only been
granted to tribal entities).
34. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb (West 2008).
35. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
36. 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
37. United States v. Hardman, 297 F.3d 1116, 1125 (10th Cir. 2002).
38. 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990).
39. Id.
40. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb. RFRA states that the "[g]ovemment shall not substantially burden
a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability...
[unless] the burden to the person is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and is the
least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest." /d. § 2000bb-l.
41. 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997).
42. Hardman, 297 F.3d at 1126.
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the federal government. 43 As a result, religious burdens imposed by the
BGEPA, a federal law, must meet the strict scrutiny standard set forth in
RFRA.
III. POST-RFRA NATIVE AMERICAN RELIGIOUS CHALLENGES TO THE
BGEPA
A. United States v. Hugs44and Differentiating As-Applied from Facial
Challenges
In United States v. Hugs the court considered a Free Exercise chal-
lenge to the BGEPA using the standards set forth in RFRA.45 In Hugs,
two defendants were convicted of violating the BGEPA.46 The defen-
dants were prosecuted after they led an undercover game warden on a
successful hunting expedition for bald and golden eagles on the Crow
Indian Reservation. 47 The defendants were precluded from bringing an
as-applied challenge to the statute because they failed to apply for a take
48permit.
A party bringing an as-applied claim may challenge a law "only in-
sofar as it has an adverse impact on his own rights."49 The claim is "eva-
luated considering how it operates in practice against the particular liti-
gant and under the facts of the instant case, not hypothetical facts in other
situations." 50 Citing Madsen v. Boise State University,51 the Hugs court
held that an individual lacks standing to challenge a rule "to which he
has not submitted himself by actually applying for the desired benefit.
52
Because the defendants did not apply for a permit, therefore, the court
only considered the defendant's facial challenge to the BGEPA.53
A successful facial challenge invalidates a statute so that it may
never be constitutionally applied.54 A party making a facial challenge
bears a heavier burden seeking to "vindicate not only his own rights, but
those of others who may also be adversely impacted by the statute in
question. 55 Generally, in federal court a facial challenge requires "a
43. Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950,959 (10th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added).
44. 109 F.3d 1375, 1377 (9th Cir. 1997). The decision in Hugs occurred while the Supreme
Court was considering the constitutionality of RFRA in Flores. Because the Supreme Court's ruling
in Flores only invalidated RFRA when applied to state matters, the court in Hugs correctly applied
the RFRA strict scrutiny standard when considering a challenge to the BGEPA, a federal law. Id. at
1377-78.
45. Id. at 1377-78.
46. Id. at 1377.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1378.
49. See County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 154-55 (1979).
50. 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 187 (2008).
51. 976 F.2d 1219, 1220-21 (9th Cir. 1992).
52. United States v. Hugs, 109 F.3d 1375, 1378 (9th Cir. 1997).
53. Id.
54. Constitutional Law, supra note 50.
55. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 55 n.22 (1999).
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showing that no set of circumstances exist under which the statute would
be valid.,
56
In analyzing the statute's facial validity in Hugs, the Ninth Circuit
held that the government's compelling interest in protecting bald and
golden eagles justified the substantial burden imposed upon Native
Americans by the BGEPA. 57 The court further held that the BGEPA's
permit exception was the least restrictive means of effectuating that in-
terest.
58
B. Unites States v. Hardman
59
In United States v. Hardman, the Tenth Circuit consolidated three
cases involving government prosecutions against Native Americans for
violating the BGEPA.60 Although the defendants failed to apply for a
take permit, the Tenth Circuit held that the defendants had standing to
challenge the statute because they were not members of a federally rec-
ognized tribe, and so it "would have been futile for these individuals to
apply for permits., 6 ' The court further held that the government's com-
pelling interest in protecting bald and golden eagles outweighed the sub-
stantial burden imposed on Native American religion.62 However be-
cause the government failed to provide information supporting its propo-
sition that "limiting permits... only to members of federally recognized
tribes is the least restrictive means of advancing the government's inter-
ests," the court ruled in favor of the defendants.63
C. United States v. Antoine
64
Similar to the situation in Hardman, in United States v. Antoine, the
Ninth Circuit considered whether the BGEPA violated RFRA with re-
gard to a Native American who was not a member of a federally recog-
nized tribe.65 Contrary to the holding in Hardman, however, the Ninth
Circuit held that the BGEPA permitting system was the least restrictive
means of achieving the government's compelling interest.66 Thus, the
fact that the defendant was not a member of a federally recognized tribe
was immaterial.
56. Constitutional Law, supra note 50.
57. See Hugs, 109 F.3d at 1378.
58. Id.
59. 297 F.3d 1116 (10th Cir. 2002).
60. ld. at 1118.
61. Id. at 1121.
62. See id. at 1126-28 (stating that "the bald eagle would remain our national symbol whether
there were 100 eagles or 100,000 eagles. The government's interest in preserving the species re-
mains compelling in either situation. What might change depending on the number of birds existing
is the scope of a program that we would accept as being narrowly tailored as the least restrictive
means of achieving its interest.").
63. Id. at 1132.
64. 318 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2003).
65. See id. at 920.
66. See id. at 923.
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The court explained that the long delays that Native Americans ex-
perience in obtaining eagle parts through the repository demonstrates the
high demand that exists with regard to federally recognized tribal mem-
bers.67 Consequently, "if the government extended [permit] eligibility
[to non-federally recognized Native Americans], every permit issued to a
nonmember would be one fewer issued to a member.", 8 The court con-
cluded, therefore, that the alternative suggested by the defendant, to al-
low non-federally recognized Native Americans to apply for permits,
"can't fairly be called 'less restrictive' [because] it places additional bur-
dens on other believers. 69
IV. UNITED STATES V. FRIDA?7°
A. Facts
Winslow Friday, a member of the Northern Arapaho Tribe of
Wyoming, shot and killed a bald eagle for the Sun Dance.71 Friday never
contacted the eagle repository, nor did he apply for a take permit before
he shot the eagle.72 The government charged Friday with violating the
BGEPA; Friday argued that enforcing the BGEPA impermissibly bur-
dened his religion in violation of RFRA.73
B. Procedural History
The Tenth Circuit reversed the decision of the United States District
Court for the District of Wyoming.74 Citing Hardman, the District Court
found that Friday had standing because it would have been futile for him
to try and obtain an eagle through either the repository or the permitting
system. 5  Because the Sun Dance calls for a "pure" eagle,76 requiring
Friday to use the National Eagle Repository was not an option.77 Also,
because the FWS issued so few take permits, the District Court held that
the permit exception within the BGEPA was effectively futile and im-
posed a substantial burden upon Native American religion.78 In addition,




70. 525 F.3d 938 (10th Cir. 2008).
71. Id. at 942.
72. Id. at 945.
73. Id. at 946.
74. Id. at 960.
75. United States v. Friday, No. 05-CR-260-D, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74970, at *8 (D. Wyo.
Oct. 13, 2006) ("Based upon the agency's conduct in every other respect, it is clear that Defendant
would not have been accommodated by applying for a take permit."), rev'd, 525 F.3d 938 (10th Cir.
2008).
76. See United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938, 943 (10th Cir. 2008). The Sun Dance requires
a "pure" eagle. The tail may not be reused, and the eagle must have been taken with care, it cannot
have died through poison, disease, or electrocution, and it cannot be roadkill.
77. See Friday, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74970, at *10, rev'd, 525 F.3d 938 (10th Cir. 2008).
78. Id. at *8, *10, rev'd, 525 F.3d 938 (10th Cir. 2008).
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was not the least restrictive means of furthering the government's com-
pelling interest.
79
The District Court held that the limited number of take permits
granted by the FWS is evidence that the process is not the least restric-
tive means of effectuating its compelling interest.80 Important to the
court's decision was the fact that the bald eagle has experienced in-
creased rates of recovery and that a greater cause of eagle mortality is
electrocution.8' Consequently, the District Court ruled in favor of Fri-
day, holding that RFRA requires the BGEPA to make more accommoda-
tions for Native American religion.
82
C. Judge McConnell's Majority Opinion
83
1. Scope of Review
Because Friday did not apply for a permit to take an eagle, the court
stated that he was precluded from raising arguments that his religion
might have been unduly burdened. 84 In other words, on an as-applied
basis, Friday was limited to challenging only those portions of the per-
mitting system that actually affected him.85  The court declared Friday
could, however, attack the statute's facial validity without having applied
for a permit.86
2. Substantial Burden
The court began by analyzing the severity of the burden imposed
upon Friday's religion.87  This is seemingly separated into a two-part
inquiry. First, the court stated that "a law that limits the Fridays' access
to the eagle needed for the ceremony substantially burdens their ability to
exercise their religion . ,88 This portion of the analysis suggests that,
had Friday applied for a permit, the court would have found that the
permitting process imposed a substantial burden.
Because Friday did not apply for a permit, however, the court only
considered whether "it substantially burdens Mr. Friday's religion to
79. See id. at * 14, rev'd, 525 F.3d 938 (10th Cir. 2008).
80. Id. at *14.
81. Id. at *14.
82. Id. at *15 ("Although the Government professes respect and accommodation of the reli-
gious practices of Native Americans, its actions show callous indifference to such practices. It is
clear to this Court that the Government has no intention of accommodating the religious beliefs of
Native Americans except on its own terms and in its own good time.").
83. United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938,942 (10th Cir. 2008).
84. Id. at 950-51 (stating, "[tihese include his claims that the process might have taken too
long, that he might have been wrongfully denied a permit even if he was entitled to one, or that the
FWS might have imposed conditions on the permit that are religiously objectionable").
85. See id. at 951.
86. Id. Friday is not precluded, for example, from arguing that the permitting process "con-
tains so many obstacles that it would effectively have been futile for him to apply for a permit."
87. See id. at 947.
88. Id. The court refers to the Friday family entity.
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require him to obtain a permit in advance of taking an eagle. '89 In taking
this path the court only considered the burdens imposed by the statute
facially. The court noted that many religious activities, like building a
church, require some form of advance authorization from the govern-
ment.90 Because Friday did not set forth sufficient evidence that his "re-
ligious tenets [were] inconsistent with using an application process," the
court found that requiring Friday to apply for a permit did not pose a
substantial burden upon his religion.9' Nonetheless, the court did not rest
its decision on the lack of a substantial burden because it concluded that
the permit process was a reasonable accommodation and narrowly tai-




The court first considered Friday's facial challenge to the BGEPA.94
Because this was a facial challenge, Friday was entitled to raise the claim
regardless of whether or not he applied for a permit.95 The District
Court, citing Hardman, found thatthe application process was futile and,
therefore, not the least restrictive means of achieving the government's
compelling interest.96 The Tenth Circuit disagreed, concluding that the
record lacked sufficient evidence showing that the permit application
process was futile.97 Unlike Hardman, in which it was "legally futile"
for the defendants to apply for a permit because they were not members
of a federally recognized tribe, the court held that Friday, a member of a
federally recognized tribe, could, in theory, have received a permit.
98
The court cited testimony that the Hopi tribe had applied, and re-
ceived, a take permit for golden eagles, and the "the record reveals no
reason to believe that an application to take a single eagle annually for
the Sun Dance... would have been treated any less favorably." 99 Al-
89. United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938, 947 (10th Cir. 2008).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 948.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 951. "A facial challenge is one that contends the statute is impermissible in all, or at
least the 'vast majority[,] of its intended applications." (quoting Doctor John's, Inc. v. City of Roy,
465 F.3d 1150, 1157 n. 5 (10th Cir. 2006)).
94. Friday, 525 F.3d at 953.
95. Id.
96. Friday, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74970, at *14-15, rev'd 525 F.3d 938 (10th Cir. 2008).
Judge McConnell noted that the District Court acknowledged that the issue decided in Hardman was
different than the case at bar. In Hardman the defendants "were not members of a federally recog-
nized tribe .... In other words, it was legally futile for them to apply because they were legally
ineligible." Friday, 525 F.3d at 953.
97. Friday, 525 F.3d at 954-55. "Although there is evidence in the record that one permit
application was denied, there is no evidence that this denial was improper, and no evidence regard-
ing other permit applications." Id.
98. Id. at 953.
99. Id. at 954.
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though the FWS may not readily issue permits, the Tenth Circuit held
that the evidence in the record did not demonstrate that the process was
futile.' °
b. Governmental Interest in Requiring Permits
Next, Friday argued that the permitting system does not advance the
government's compelling interest in protecting eagles because allowing
Native American religious takings does not harm eagle populations.' 0 t
The court disagreed stating that the permitting system was facially va-
lid. 0 2 This is because it allows the government to track the amount of
legally taken eagles, gives the government discretion over what eagles
can be taken, and allows the government to allocate takings in a manner
that protects eagle populations as a whole.
0 3
4. As-Applied Challenges
a. The Sacred Nature of the Sun Dance
The court first addressed Friday's argument that 50 C.F.R. §
13.21(e)(2)'0 4 violates the sacred nature of the Sun Dance. 0 5 Judge
McConnell noted that if this provision was construed to allow FWS
agents to attend the Sun Dance, this "condition would violate the sacred
nature of the ritual.' 1 6 However, because Friday testified that he did not
know about the permitting system until after he killed the eagle, the pro-
vision "could not have influenced Mr. Friday's decision not to apply for




b. Lack of Outreach
The court then considered the as-applied challenges to the permit-
ting process that affected Friday, given that he did not apply for a per-
mit.1°9 First, Friday argued that the permit program lacked any type of
100. Id. at 955.
101. See id. at 955. Friday conceded that the government had a compelling interest in protect-
ing bald and golden eagles. Id. at 956. Instead, Friday argued that the permitting system was facial-
ly impermissible because it did not advance the government's compelling interest. Id. at 955.
102. Id. at 956.
103. See id. at 955. As Judge McConnell stated, "[e]ven if unregulated religious takings would
not be numerous enough to threaten the viability of eagle populations, the government would still
have a compelling interest in ensuring that no more eagles are taken than necessary, and that takings
occur in places and ways that minimize the impact." Id. at 956.
104. The provision states "by accepting a permit, the permittee... shall allow entry by agents.
•. upon premises where the permitted activity is conducted."
105. Id. at 951-52.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. Judge McConnell noted, "[s]hould the FWS insist on an inspection that would violate
tribal religious beliefs, an affected person or tribe could bring an as-applied claim under RFRA
specifically targeted to the religiously offensive condition." Id.
109. Id. at 956-57.
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outreach.' 10 As a result, very few Native Americans knew that the permit
program existed; and thus, Friday argued that the permit application
process was not the least restrictive means of furthering the govern-
ment's interest.' The court dismissed this claim, stating that the permit
process is published in 16 U.S.C. § 668.112 Further, the court held that
the government did not violate Friday's Free Exercise rights simply be-
cause he was unaware of the existence of an available accommodation."
13
Eliminating another potential challenge to the BGEPA, the court
ruled that the government's trust obligation to Native Americans did not
require the government to engage in affirmative outreach. 1 4 The court
stated that in Friday's case there was no legal trust obligation" 5 because
the BGEPA does not create any type of fiduciary relationship, and be-
cause the case did not involve Native American property held in trust by
the government." 16
c. Electrocution
Finally, the court addressed Friday's argument that the government
could preserve the eagle in a less restrictive manner by prosecuting the
electric companies whose power lines electrocute eagles.'1 7 The Court
responded to this argument by stating that the government does prosecute
electric companies whose power lines kill eagles." 
8
The court concluded by stating that the government attempts to ac-
commodate the Native American religion while still accomplishing its
compelling interest.119 Although the permit process might be "improper-
ly restrictive, burdensome, unresponsive or slow," the court stated that




In the following analysis of the Friday opinion, section A provides
a detailed synopsis of the aforementioned precedent in combination with
110. Id.




115. See Perkins, supra note 11, at 704 (arguing that the Federal Indian Trust Doctrine might
provide a means of attacking the constitutionality of the BGEPA).
116. United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938, 957-58 (10th Cir. 2008).
117. Id. at 958 ("Mr. Friday is correct that when strict scrutiny is applicable the government is
generally not permitted to punish religious damage to its compelling interest while letting equally
serious secular damage go unpunished.").
118. Id. at 958-59 ("In the one recorded case on the subject, a Colorado district court agreed
with the government, and refused to dismiss criminal charges under the Eagle Act and the Migratory
Bird Treaty Act against a rural electric company whose wires had killed 38 eagles, without proof of
intent or even of negligence.").
119. Id. at 960.
120. Id.
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Friday in order to better understand the state of the law as it applies to
Native American RFRA challenges against the BGEPA. Section B de-
scribes the avenues left open for future litigants challenging the statute
on both an as-applied basis and challenging the statute's facial validity.
Although Friday implies that future challenges are going to be successful
only on an as-applied basis, section B also suggests that the court in Fri-
day may have imposed a futility standard that was too strict and not in
accordance with relevant precedent. As such, future litigants are pro-
vided with an additional means of challenging the facial validity of the
statute.
A. Native American Religious Challenges to the BGEPA: Synopsis
1. Substantial Burden
Since the enactment of RFRA, case law suggests that the BGEPA
does impose a substantial burden upon Native American religious prac-
tices. 12 1 In Friday, the court did not find that the permitting system, in
itself, posed a substantial burden; 122 it did, however, find that the permit
process would impose a burden on a Native American who actually ap-
plies for a permit.
123
2. Compelling Governmental Interest
t24
All courts found, and defendants generally do not challenge, that the
government has a compelling interest in protecting bald and golden
eagles. 12 5  A minority of courts held that the government does not pos-
sess a compelling interest in protecting golden eagles and other birds that
are not endangered. 26 Yet, no court held that the government does not
possess a compelling interest in protecting bald eagles, regardless of
121. United States v. Hugs, 109 F.3d 1375, 1378 (9th Cir. 1997) ("We do not question that the
BGEPA imposed a substantial burden on the practice of such religions by restricting the ability of
adherents to obtain and possess eagles and eagle parts."); see also United States v. Antoine, 318 F.3d
919, 921 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding "that BGEPA imposed a substantial burden"); United States v,
Hardman, 297 F.3d 1116, 1126-27 (10th Cir. 2002) ("Any scheme that limits their access to eagle
feathers therefore must be seen as having a substantial effect on the exercise of religious belief.").
122. Thus, if a Native American does not apply for a permit, that person cannot claim that the
permitting system imposes a substantial burden upon his or her religion.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 88-90.
124. "Whether something qualifies as a compelling interest is a question of law." Hardman,
297 F.3d at 1127.
125. See Hugs, 109 F.3d at 1378 ("The Hugs do not deny that protection of bald and golden
eagles serves a compelling government interest."); Antoine, 318 F.3d at 924 ("The government has a
compelling interest in eagle protection that justifies limiting supply to eagles that pass through the
repository, even though religious demand exceeds supply as a result."); Hardman, 297 F.3d at 1128.
126. United States v. Abeyta, 632 F.Supp. 1301, 1307 (D.N.M. 1986) ("The golden eagle is not
an endangered species. The uncontradicted testimony at trial established that some eagles could be
taken without harmful impact on the remaining population. The government's conservation interests
therefore are not compelling and cannot warrant a constriction of Indian religious liberty."); see also
Horen v. Commonwealth, 479 S.E.2d 553, 559 (Va. Ct. App. 1997) ("However, the Commonwealth
has not established that application of Code § 29.1-521(A)(10) to the Horens furthers any compel-
ling state interest.").
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whether or not it is listed on the endangered species list.127 Whether or
not the bald eagle is listed as endangered, however, could affect what
constitutes the least restrictive means of protecting eagles: "[w]hat might
change depending on the number of birds existing is the scope of a pro-
gram that we would accept as being narrowly tailored as the least restric-
tive means of achieving its interest. ' 2  In Friday, the court found that
the government did possess a compelling interest in protecting bald and
golden eagles.
1 29
3. Least Restrictive Means
1 30
The least restrictive means aspect of the strict scrutiny test provides
future litigants with the greatest opportunity for successfully challenging
the BGEPA. To fulfill its burden, the government must prove that "no
alternative forms of regulation would combat such abuses without in-
fringing First Amendment rights." 131
With regard to Native American challenges against the BGEPA, the
least restrictive means portion of the analysis has received differing
treatment. In Hugs, the court found the permitting system necessary to
ensure that eagles are used only for religious purposes; as such, the court
held that the system was the least restrictive means available to protect
eagles.132 Importantly, because the defendants never applied for a per-
mit, the court held that they were "precluded from challenging any defi-
ciencies in the manner in which the permit system operates.' 33
In Hardman, the Tenth Circuit held that the government "failed to
show that limiting permits for eagle feathers only to members of federal-
ly recognized tribes is the least restrictive means of advancing the gov-
ernment's interests." 134 In other words, the government did not suffi-
ciently prove that the BGEPA's limitation, which restricts granting per-
mits to members of federally recognized tribes, was the least restrictive
means of effectuating its compelling interest.
In Antoine, contrary to the Tenth Circuit's opinion in Hardman, the
court held that restricting permits to federally recognized tribal members
was the least restrictive means of effectuating the government's inter-
127. United States v. Hardman, 297 F.3d 1116, 1128 (10th Cir. 2002) ("The bald eagle would
remain our national symbol whether there were 100 eagles or 100,000 eagles. The government's
interest in preserving the species remains compelling in either situation.").
128. Id.
129. United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938, 955 (10th Cir. 2008).
130. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Supreme Court defined least restrictive means in the realm of
Free Exercise. 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972). "[O]nly those interests of the highest order and those not
otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion." Id.
131. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963).
132. United States v. Hugs, 109 F.3d 1375, 1378 (9th Cir. 1997).
133. Id. at 1379. In other words, the court did not consider the validity of the permitting sys-
tem on an as-applied basis.
134. United States v, Hardman, 297 F.3d 1116, 1132 (10th Cir. 2002).
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est.135 Important to the court's rationale was the fact that federally rec-
ognized tribal members experienced long delays in obtaining eagles from
the repository. 36 As such, providing more Native Americans with access
to eagles would only increase delays and would not be less restrictive.
1 37
To summarize, the circuits are split as to whether the BGEPA's fed-
erally recognized tribe limitation is the least restrictive means for the
government to further its compelling interest. With regard to the rest of
the permitting system, the circuit courts held that the system is conducted
in the least restrictive manner and is facially valid.
B. Future Litigation: Avenues Left Open After Friday
Although the Friday decision likely yields some positive implica-
tions for Native Americans,' 38 future litigation may offer additional re-
dress. The following sections explore ways in which a future litigant
might bring successful as-applied and facial attacks against the BGEPA.
An individual bringing a facial challenge bears a much greater burden
than an individual bringing an as-applied challenge. 139 As such, a future
litigant who actually applies for a permit is more likely to successfully
challenge the BGEPA.
1. As-Applied Challenges I: Applying for a Permit
If a Native American is prosecuted for violating the BGEPA after
having applied for a take permit, the individual will make a strong as-
applied challenge against the statute. In this type of scenario the individ-
ual will argue that the permitting system is not the least restrictive means
for the government to protect eagles. Courts have not considered the
issue extensively because an individual has never faced prosecution after
having applied for a permit. The courts evaluating the permitting sys-
tem, therefore, only considered its facial validity.
Because the bald eagle no longer faces the risk of extinction,
14°
granting permits no longer affects the preservation of bald eagles to the
extent it would have in the past.t41 Evidence regarding the restrictive
135. Id. at 922-23.
136. Id. at 923.
137. Id.
138. The Friday opinion might, for example, notify Native Americans that they can apply for
an eagle take permit; the opinion might also notify the FWS that the permitting system is very re-
strictive and result in an increased amount of permits granted.
139. Constitutional Law, supra note 50 ("An 'as applied' challenge is a claim that the opera-
tion of a statute is unconstitutional in a particular case, while a facial challenge indicates that the
statute may rarely or never be constitutionally applied.").
140. Removing the Bald Eagle in the Lower 48 States From the List of Endangered and
Threatened Wildlife, 72 C.F.R. 37346-01, 37346 (2007).
141. But see United States v. Antoine, 318 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2003) ("changed circumstances
may, in theory, transform a compelling interest into a less than compelling one, or render a well-
tailored statute misproportioned. Nonetheless, the government cannot reasonably be expected to
reitigate the issue with every increase in the eagle population").
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nature of the permitting system adds support to an as-applied challenge.
For example, although the FWS has issued permits to take golden eagles,
there has never been a permit issued to take a bald eagle. 42 In addition,
the FWS has only granted permits to tribal entities, but never to individ-
ual tribal members.
143
This hypothetical as-applied scenario would look something like
this: an individual Native American applies for a permit to take a bald
eagle for a sincere Native American religious ceremony; after the FWS
denies the permit application, the individual still takes the eagle for a
religious ceremony and is prosecuted for violating the BGEPA; the Na-
tive American then brings an as-applied challenge against the BGEPA.
Under RFRA, the individual will likely not have any trouble asserting
that the permit denial or undue delay posed a substantial burden. 44
Likewise, the government will have no trouble asserting that it has a
compelling interest in protecting bald eagles.1
45
The threshold matter, then, becomes whether or not the restrictive
nature of the permitting process is narrowly tailored and the least restric-
tive means for the government to protect eagles. To meet this require-
ment, the government must prove that "no alternative forms of regulation
would combat such abuses without infringing first Amendment
rights."' 146 Because "[t]he bald eagle population in the lower 48 States
has increased from approximately 487 active nests in 1963, to an esti-
mated minimum 9,789 breeding pairs today," the FWS promulgated a
final rule to remove the bald eagle from the endangered species list. 147
Citing Hardman, "[w]hat might change depending on the number of
birds existing is the scope of a program that we would accept as being
narrowly tailored as the least restrictive means of achieving its inter-
est."' 148 Following this logic, and given the fact that the FWS has never
issued a take permit for a bald eagle, this individual makes a very strong
as-applied argument that the permitting system is not conducted in the
least restrictive manner.
In issuing a permit, the FWS considers "[t]he direct or indirect ef-
fect which issuing such permit would be likely to have upon the wild
142. Brief of Amicus Curiae of the Northern Arapaho Tribe in Support of Defendant-Appellee
at *1, United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938, No. 06-8093 (10th Cir. July 2, 2007), 2007 WL
2437228.
143. Id. at *3-*4.
144. See United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938, 947 (10th Cir. 2008) ("[A] law that limits...
access to the eagle needed for the ceremony substantially burdens their ability to exercise their
religion by sponsoring and taking part in the Sun Dance.").
145. See United States v. Hardman, 297 F.3d 1116, 1128 (10th Cir. 2002) ("[T]he bald eagle
would remain our national symbol whether there were 100 eagles or 100,000 eagles, the govern-
ment's interest in preserving the species remains compelling in either situation.").
146. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,407 (1963).
147. Removing the Bald Eagle in the Lower 48 States From the List of Endangered and
Threatened Wildlife, 72 C.F.R. 37346-01, 37346 (2007).
148. Hardman, 297 F.3d at 1128.
2009] 1147
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
populations of bald or golden eagles." 149 Because the bald eagle is no
longer endangered, this consideration lends support to the hypothetical
individual's argument that denying all take permits is overly restrictive.
It would be much less restrictive if the FWS were to grant the occasional
take permit for religious purposes; further, the FWS can still meet its
criteria requiring consideration of a take permit's effect upon eagle popu-
lations. 50
In sum, this person presents a strong argument that the permitting
system is unconstitutional because the bald eagle is no longer endangered
and the individual in question applied, but did not receive a take permit.
On an as-applied basis, this hypothetical scenario suggests that the per-
mitting scheme is not the least restrictive means available for the gov-
ernment to effectuate its compelling interest.
2. As-Applied Challenges II: The Sacred Nature of the Sun Dance
Another potential as-applied challenge is mentioned by the court in
Friday. Under 50 C.F.R. §13.21(e)(2), an individual who receives a take
permit is required to "allow entry by agents.., upon premises where the
permitted activity is conducted.'' In Friday, the court states that if this
provision allows FWS agents to attend a religious ceremony like the Sun
Dance, and "should the FWS insist on an inspection that would violate
tribal religious beliefs, an affected person or tribe could bring an as-
applied claim under RFRA specifically targeted at the religiously offen-
sive condition.'1 52 The Court never considers this issue in Friday be-
cause Friday was unaware that the permit system even existed, and there-
fore, this provision could not have affected his decision to not apply for a
permit.
153
3. Facial Challenges I: A Second Look at Futility
In Friday, the Court differentiated the futility faced by the defen-
dants in Hardman from the alleged futility faced by Friday. 154 In Hard-
man, according to the court in Friday, it was "legally futile" for the de-
fendants to apply for a permit because they were not members of a feder-
ally recognized tribe, and therefore, ineligible to receive permits. 55 In
Hardman, the court cites Jackson-Bey v. Hanslmaier56 and International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States157 to support its futility ar-
149. 50 C.F.R. § 22.22(c)(1) (2009).
150. Id.
151. Id. § 13.21(e)(2).
152. United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938, 952 (10th Cir. 2008).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 953.
155. Id.
156. 115 F.3d 1091 (2d Cir. 1997).
157. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
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gument1 58 The following section suggests that the court in Friday im-
posed a futility standard that was too strict and not in accordance with
this precedent.
In Jackson-Bey, a prison inmate filed suit against several prison of-
ficials alleging that they violated the Free Exercise Clause by precluding
him from wearing certain religious garments to a funeral while he was
incarcerated. 59 Because the inmate never applied for the benefit of
wearing his religious garments, the prison officials argued that the in-
mate lacked standing. 16° The Second Circuit stated that the "threshold
requirement for standing may be excused only where a plaintiff makes a
substantial showing that application for the benefit would have been fu-
tile."'161 Because the prisoner failed to show that his religion would not
have been accommodated had he applied for the benefit, the court held
that the registration process was not futile and that the prisoner lacked
standing. 162
Although denying the plaintiff standing, the opinion does not sug-
gest a claimant must show that an application process is strictly impossi-
ble for a finding of futility. Instead, the opinion suggests that a claimant
must only "make a substantial showing" that applying would have been
futile. 163 The "substantial showing" language in Jackson-Bey suggests
that the Tenth Circuit's interpretation requiring an application process to
be "legally futile" reaches too far.
The Supreme Court's opinion in International Brotherhood pro-
vides further support for the argument that the futility standard adopted
in Friday was too strict. In International Brotherhood the Supreme
Court analyzed futility in the realm of employment discrimination.1
64
Although the employees never applied for the job in which the alleged
discrimination occurred, the Court held that the "employee's failure to
apply for a job is not an inexorable bar to an award .... Individual non-
applicants must be given an opportunity to undertake their difficult task
of proving that they should be treated as applicants ... ." ,65 The Court
held that the government provided ample evidence of discrimination
which made clear that it would have been futile for the employees to
158. United States v. Hardman, 297 F.3d 1116,1121 (10th Cir. 2002).
159. Jackson-Bey, 115 F.3d at 1093.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1096.
162. See id. at 1097-98.
163. See id. at 1096.
164. Int. Bd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 328 (1977).
165. Id. at 364.
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have applied. 66 As a result, the Court allowed the employees to chal-
lenge the employment practices without ever applying for the job.
167
The rationales in Hardman, Jackson-Bey, and International Bro-
therhood all suggest that the Court in Friday imposed a futility standard
that was too strict and not in accordance with precedent. In Friday, the
court differentiated Hardman by stating it would have been "legally fu-
tile" for the defendants in Hardman to apply for a permit because they
were not members of a federally recognized tribe, whereas Friday was
not legally precluded from receiving a permit. 168  In other words, the
court equated futility with impossibility; the aforementioned precedent,
however, suggests otherwise. Although it was legally futile for the de-
fendants in Hardman to apply for a permit, the opinion never suggests
that strict impossibility is a prerequisite.
169
A precedent-based definition of futility does not require an individ-
ual to show that obtaining a permit would have been legally impossible,
as argued by the court in Friday; rather, an individual must only make a
"substantial showing" of futility. Given this analysis, the evidence in
Friday that the FWS has never granted a bald eagle take permit 170 might
bear some weight. Although refuted by the Court in Friday,171 this evi-
dence provides adequate support that the FWS would not have accom-
modated Friday's religious needs had he applied for a take permit. The
application process was, therefore, futile.
Adding further support to Friday's futility argument is the fact that
the bald eagle was still listed as threatened on the Endangered Species
List when Friday killed the eagle. 172 Thus, even had the FWS granted
Friday a take permit under the BGEPA, the Endangered Species Act
(ESA) would still have prevented Friday from legally taking the eagle.
17 3
In its reply brief, the United States argued that 50 C.F.R. § 17.32 autho-
rizes the Secretary to issue a permit allowing an individual to take a spe-
cies protected by the ESA.174 If Friday's religious taking fit within one
166. See id. at 365-66. The Court further noted that the employees needed to provide evidence
that they would have applied for the job but for the alleged discrimination. Id. at 371.
167. See id. at 371.
168. United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938,953 (10th Cir. 2008).
169. See United States v. Hardman, 297 F.3d 1116, 1121 (10th Cir. 2002).
170. Appellee's Opening Brief at 31, United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938 (10th Cir. 2008)
(No. 06-8093).
171. Friday, 525 F.3d at 955 ("It is simply not clear that [Mr. Friday] would not have received
a permit if he had applied, and therefore it is not clear that he would not have been accommodated
by not applying for one.") (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original).
172. See id. at 945; Removing the Bald Eagle in the Lower 48 States From the List of Endan-
gered and Threatened Wildlife, 50 C.F.R. pt. 17 (2007).
173. This argument is never addressed by the court in Friday because Friday never expressly
made the argument. See Reply Brief of Appellant at 13-14, United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938
(10th Cir. 2008) (No. 06-8093).
174. Id. This provision only allows the issuance of a permit "for one of the following purpos-
es: Scientific purposes, or the enhancement of propagation or survival, or economic hardship, or
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of the categories listed in 50 C.F.R. § 17.32, the Secretary would have
been authorized to issue a take permit for the bald eagle. 175 If Friday's
taking did not fit within 50 C.F.R. § 17.32, however, then it actually was
"legally futile" for him to apply for a permit. 176 The mere presence of
the eagle on the Endangered Species List at the time of the taking should
have, at a minimum, added support to Friday's futility argument.
4. Facial Challenges II: Requiring Permission to Take an Eagle
Imposes a Substantial Burden
The Friday opinion suggests another way in which a future litigant
may bring a successful facial challenge. The court states, "[1n theory a
claimant's beliefs might forbid him from asking the government for per-
mission to take the eagle, perhaps because such a request would fail to
treat the eagle as 'a gift of the Creator."",177  The court seemingly sug-
gests that an individual could challenge the mere fact that the BGEPA
requires an individual to ask permission to take an eagle. The court nev-
er considers this issue in Friday, however, because Friday never made
the argument.17
8
During trial, Nelson White Eagle, a member of the Northern Arapa-
ho tribe, testified concerning using the repository to obtain eagles: "[i]t's
like you, the non-Indian. You know, you don't have a repository for the
Bible,. . . and our Bible is from... the mother earth alone."' 179 Although
Friday never made the argument expressly, Nelson White Eagle's testi-
mony suggests that the Northern Arapaho tribe considers using the repo-
sitory to obtain an eagle as analogous to forcing a non-Indian to use a
repository to obtain a Bible. 80 Following this logic, even having to ask
permission to take an eagle imposes a substantial burden upon Native
American religion.'
81
zoological exhibition, or educational purposes, or incidental taking, or special purposes consistent
with the purposes of the Act." 50 C.F.R. § 17.32 (2009).
175. 50 C.F.R. § 17.32 (2009).
176. This is because even if he had been granted a take permit under the BGEPA, he would
still have been precluded from taking the eagle under the ESA.
177. United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938, 947 (10th Cir. 2008).
178. Id. at 947.
179. Appellee's Opening Brief at 9, United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938 (10th Cir. 2008)
(No. 06-8093).
180. Id.
181. Importantly, this argument applies only to the substantial burden portion of the RFRA
analysis. The court in Friday suggested this potential argument as a way that Friday could have
demonstrated a substantial burden without having applied for a permit. However, as previously
noted, as the eagle continues successful recovery, the least restrictive means requirements may
change, and this argument provides a way for an individual to demonstrate a substantial burden
without actually applying for a permit.
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5. Facial Challenges HI: The Federally-Recognized Tribe
Requirement1
8 2
As previously mentioned, there is a circuit split with regard to
whether the BGEPA's permitting system, which limits available permits
to members of federally recognized tribes, is the least restrictive means
of effectuating the government's interests.' 83 Here, a future challenge
involves a sincere practitioner of a Native American religion, who is not
a member of a federally recognized tribe, foregoing the permit applica-
tion process. 184 Unless the government provides evidence that limiting
permits to federally recognized tribal members is the least restrictive way
to protect eagles, the individual might bring a successful challenge to the
facial validity of this portion of the BGEPA permitting scheme.
CONCLUSION
Judge McConnell's opinion in United States v. Friday closed many
avenues for future litigants seeking to challenge the constitutionality of
the BGEPA. The greatest chance of success will arise when a Native
American applies to take an eagle for a religious ceremony and is denied
or experiences undue delay. If prosecuted, the individual will make a
strong case that the permitting system within the BGEPA is not the least
restrictive way for the government to ensure the protection of eagles. In
addition to future as-applied challenges to the BGEPA, future litigants
may successfully challenge the statute's facial validity. One might ar-
gue, for example, that the futility standard imposed in Friday was too
strict, or that having to ask permission to practice religion is burdensome,
or that the BGEPA's sole application to federally recognized tribes is
overly restrictive.
The bald eagle has made great strides in its recovery as a species
and is no longer in danger of extinction, and yet the FWS has never
granted a Native American a permit to take a bald eagle. As such, a fu-
ture litigant bringing an as-applied challenge will make a strong case that
the BGEPA permitting exception for Native American religion is not
conducted in the least restrictive manner. For if the FWS does not intend
to grant bald eagle take permits, why have the exception at all?
182. 50 C.F.R. § 22.22 (2009).
183. Compare United States v. Hardman, 297 F.3d 1116, 1132 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that
the government "failed to show that limiting permits for eagle feathers only to members of federally
recognized tribes is the least restrictive means of advancing the government's interests."), with
United States v. Antoine, 318 F.3d 919, 923 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding, "[w]e do not believe that
RFRA requires the government to make the showing that the Tenth Circuit demands of it").
184. United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938, 953 (10th Cir. 2008).
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